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A B S T R A C T1
When created, international criminal tribunals (ICTs) were not only expected to do
justice but also to provide stabilization to postconflict regions, contribute to reconcili-
ation and curb the potential denial of atrocities. Based on media content analysis, this
article examines whether controversial ICT decisions triggered changes in narratives or
frames about the conflicts which formed the background of the respective ICT deci-
sions. There is no evidence for dramatic changes in the preexisting narratives about
these conflicts, but we found some cases in which tribunal decisions caused changes in
media frames and in elements of such frames, mostly by emphasizing outgroup victim-
hood and individual responsibility of ingroup perpetrators, as well as triggering effects
of collective guilt externalization. Although frame changes were often observed in both
democratic and nondemocratic countries, only in democratic countries with pluralist
and competitive media systems could they be attributed to tribunal decisions.
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When the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and the
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) were created, they were first
and foremost expected to do justice and prosecute perpetrators of the most heinous
crimes. However, in the respective UN General Assembly (UNGA) resolutions and
the resolutions of the UN Security Council (UNSC), we also find the expectation
that these tribunals might contribute to peacekeeping, stabilize the countries under
their jurisdiction and even – in the case of Rwanda – contribute to reconciliation.
Later on, judges at both tribunals referred to these expectations, invoking reconcili-
ation in order to justify some of their judgments and decisions, pointing to the
(alleged) will of victims or the (also alleged) need to reintegrate perpetrators.1 One
of the more specific expectations in this context was the wish that the tribunals might
‘shrink the space for denial.’2 The wish to curb denial was the main motive behind
the creation of an outreach programme by the ad hoc international criminal tribunals
(ICTs).3
At the International Criminal Court (ICC), outreach and extrajudicial tasks had
less importance due to the limited scope of judicial intervention which the ICC can
undertake. The UNSC can refer a situation to the ICC prosecutor, but without such
a referral, the ICC’s possible interference with signatories to the statute is limited to
cases where a state is either unwilling or unable to prosecute international crimes
under the Rome Statute. As long as a state party can show its willingness and cap-
acity to hold perpetrators of such crimes accountable, there is neither a need nor a
way for the ICC to step in. Additionally, the gravity threshold of the Rome Statute in
principle also restricts the ICC’s possible interference to cases of mass atrocities and
crimes committed by high-ranking perpetrators. Unlike the ICTY and the ICTR, the
ICC does not work under a primacy principle which would give it the right to claim
any suspect and take over any case it deems appropriate. It functions as a kind of
‘court of last resort’ which can only take over cases that are not being investigated by
the respective country. The determination of whether a country is willing and able to
prosecute a crime usually takes quite a lot of time, therefore the ICC often investi-
gates crimes which took place many years ago. All this makes it much more difficult
for the ICC to ‘shrink the space for denial,’ or, in general, to fulfil extrajudicial tasks
like reconciliation and postconflict stabilization.
The literature about ICTs and international criminal justice is dominated by law-
yers, who focus on ICT tasks, the material and institutional law applied by ICTs and
discussions on the functioning of the tribunals and the coherence of their jurispru-
dence. A part of this literature meanders between law and sociological institutional-
ism and tracks decisions, trying to reveal how and why certain decisions at ICTs
1 Klaus Bachmann, Thomas Sparrow-Botero and Peter Lambertz, When Justice Meets Politics: Independence
and Autonomy of Ad Hoc International Criminal Tribunals (Frankfurt: Peter Lang, 2013).
2 Diane F. Orentlicher, Shrinking the Space for Denial: The Impact of the ICTY in Serbia (New York: Open
Society Institute, 2008).
3 Klaus Bachmann telephonic interview with Gabrielle Kirk McDonald, the second ICTY president, April
2012; personal interview, Refik Hodzic, ICTY press spokesperson under Kirk McDonald, New York, April
2012; personal interview, Innocent Kamenzi, outreach officer at the ICTR, Kigali, Rwanda, July 2012.







niversity of Stellenbosch user on 25 N
ovem
ber 2021
were taken and how they were influenced by external and internal factors.4 This
body of research dealing with ‘process control’ is supplemented by a growing litera-
ture on the relations between intra-court decision making and the wider public and
often concentrates either on issues of judicial behaviour (how judges and courts are
influenced by external factors)5 or on the question of how courts and judges influ-
ence the public’s perceptions and media coverage. This is at the core of this article’s
interest. Its purpose is to find whether – and if so, how – tribunal decisions impact
public opinion, or, more precisely, media frames about the conflicts which formed
the background of the respective tribunals’ jurisprudence. Our aim is to contribute to
a scholarly debate which has lasted for several centuries (starting with the anti-
slavery tribunals) and whose core concerns the argument in Kathryn Sikkink’s ‘just-
ice cascade.’6
As Sikkink, Thomas Risse and others have shown, legal change may be fostered
by nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and networks of so-called norm entre-
preneurs that initiate transnational change through lobbying and their access to
media.7 The process starts with small groups of activists in countries hostile to legal
innovation (like new human rights legislation) campaigning and connecting with ex-
ternal and international networks of norm entrepreneurs. They in turn use their in-
fluence on their norm-friendly governments to extract concessions from norm-
hostile governments in negotiations about trade or political issues which are import-
ant for the norm-hostile government. Lobbying takes place in the form of traditional
campaigns and through the use of traditional and new media (e.g. internet, social
media, transnational television). Once a government that is hostile to new human
rights legislation concedes to include some innovations into its legal system, local
activists take up the ball and launch strategic litigation campaigns. In this way, they
infuse new human rights norms which the government did not want to submit to
parliament, into the courts. Domestic judges act as occasional legislators, adding new
interpretations of existing legislation in accordance with the norms promoted by the
litigators. At the end of this process, new human rights norms are applied despite the
government’s reluctance or (in autocratic systems) even hostility to endorse them.
This model has mostly been applied to explain the introduction of new human
rights legislation in countries with weak human rights records and autocratic political
systems. Furthermore, it explains why nondemocratic governments hostile to human
4 Nancy A. Combs, Fact-Finding without Facts: The Uncertain Evidentiary Foundations of International
Criminal Convictions (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007); Gideon Boas, The Milosevic Trial:
Lessons for the Conduct of Complex International Criminal Proceedings (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 2010); Klaus Bachmann and Aleksandar Fatic, The UN International Criminal Tribunals: Transition
without Justice? (London: Routledge, 2015).
5 Barbora Holá, Alette Smeulers and Catrien Bijleveld, ‘Is ICTY Sentencing Predictable? An Empirical
Analysis of ICTY Sentencing Practice,’ Leiden Journal of International Law 22 (2009): 79–97. From the
same authors: ‘International Sentencing Facts and Figures: Sentencing Practice at the ICTY and ICTR,’
Journal of International Criminal Justice 9(2) (2011): 411–439; and about the ICTR: ‘Punishment for
Genocide: Exploratory Analysis of ICTR Sentencing,’ International Criminal Law Review 11(4) (2011):
745–773.
6 Kathryn Sikkink, The Justice Cascade: How Human Rights Prosecutions Are Changing World Politics (New
York: W.W. Norton, 2010).
7 Thomas Risse, Stephen C. Ropp and Kathryn Sikkink, eds., The Power of Human Rights: International
Norms and Domestic Change (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999).
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rights end up with modern human rights laws, which – in the long run – may even
undermine their rule. Sikkink’s model has been praised as well as criticized.8 In this
article we test a very narrow hypothesis, derived from the ‘cascade’ model, and ask
whether ICTs function as ‘norm entrepreneurs’ and initiate changes in countries
whose public and governments are hostile to some or all of the norms promoted by
the respective ICTs. We do so in a very small field, where impact is relatively easy to
detect and can be described in detail – at the junction between ‘the tribunal’ and ‘the
media.’ Sikkink’s model hypothesizes direct influence to take place only after a very
long time, when the water from the ‘justice cascade’ has trickled down from the
international level, through the media and public opinion of norm-friendly countries
to the media and public sphere of norm-hostile countries, and then finally, after years
or even decades, it might or might not have changed the human rights law applied in
countries under ICT jurisdiction. There is a methodological problem with such an
approach: if the change which the model anticipates is supposed to occur after such
a long time (the length of which the model does not predict), it is impossible to
measure and disentangle it from other factors. Thus, even if we observe an authori-
tarian country showing increasing respect for human rights, how can we be sure after
such a long time that it was the result of the ‘justice cascade’ rather than something
else? Thus our interest in detecting short-time changes caused by ICT decisions on
media frames about the underlying conflict. We are not interested in changes in
media frames about the respective tribunals – such research has been done exhaust-
ively.9 Usually, ingroup members and media praise a tribunal when it indicts or sen-
tences a protagonist of the outgroup, and discard its findings when they shed a bad
light on ingroup members.
This article focuses only on those media frames which deal with the underlying
conflict, the elements of which were investigated by the relevant ICT and formed the
background to the ICT trial. Our aim was to explore how certain decisions which in-
clude specific interpretations of past events affected the way in which the media
described these events after the respective ICT decisions. This impact was measured
by applying qualitative frame analysis: after an indictment was published or a judg-
ment issued, we compared the frames about the underlying events to the frames
8 Tricia Olsen, Leigh Payne and Andrew Reiter, Transitional Justice in Balance: Comparing Processes, Weighing
Efficacy (Washington, DC: US Institute of Peace, 2010); Padraig McAuliffe, ‘The Roots of Transitional
Accountability: Interrogating the “Justice Cascade”,’ International Journal of Law in Context 9(1) (2013):
106–123.
9 In most cases, media coverage about ICT decisions was very predictable. If an ICT took a decision favour-
able to an accused, it was praised by the accused’s supporters but those who sided with the actual or
alleged victims were outraged. If the decision was unfavourable to the accused, victim communities praised
it and the accused’s supporters were outraged. In the case of the ICTR, the issue was even simpler: the
public, the media and victim groups in Rwanda were always in favour of the harshest possible punishment
and were always outraged when a sentence was lenient. This was because the ICTR only judged perpetra-
tors from one side of the conflict and in post-genocide Rwanda only the victors of the war (and the victims
of the genocide) had a voice. Mirko Klarin, ‘The Impact of the ICTY Trials on Public Opinion in the
Former Yugoslavia,’ Journal of International Criminal Justice 7(1) (2009): 89–96; Frances Trix,
‘Underwhelmed: Kosovar Albanians’ Reactions to the Milosevic Trial,’ and Klaus Bachmann, ‘Framing the
Trial of the Century: Influences of, and on, International Media,’ both in The Milosevic Trial: An Autopsy,
ed. Timothy Waters (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013).
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used by the same media before the respective decisions in order to establish whether
the frame had changed.
In this article, an ‘ICT decision’ refers not only to an indictment or verdict, but to
any decision made by an ICT organ which resonated in the public sphere. For ex-
ample, the ICC never issued any verdict against a Sudanese suspect nor against any
of the politicians and journalists involved in the Kenya situation.10 The ICTY, for its
part, tried to solve the problems arising from lack of state cooperation by issuing se-
cret indictments. In these cases, indictments of which the public and the media were
unaware could hardly be expected to impact on media frames. Instead, other deci-
sions – public indictments and verdicts at the ICTY and the ICTR as well as arrest
warrants by the ICC – were more likely to cause shifts in media frames. But there
were also exceptions to this rule. The ICC decision to end proceedings in the
Kenyan cases had as much impact on media coverage as the decision to issue arrest
warrants had done before. This is why we chose to examine the impact of different
types of decisions on media frames rather than sticking to the narrow and legalistic
notions of indictment and judgment.
G R A N D N A R R A T I V E S , F R A M E S A N D F R A M E E L E M E N T S A B O U T T H E
U N D E R L Y I N G C O N F L I C T S
Consumers of media outlets tend to perceive narratives and opinions in newspapers
and electronic media as true and consistent with established facts and common
knowledge. However, rather than assuming that reporting is necessarily derived from
some prior, objective and univariate reality, media analysts ask why certain media de-
scribe things in one way while others do so in a different way. The basic assumption
of this approach is that every media outlet and every journalist can choose from a
multitude of options when deciding to present a specific issue. By writing about an
identified issue, media draw upon and refer to cognitive schemes, called ‘frames,’
which provide categories, order and chronology that allow the reader (and author)
to organize fragmented information and attribute meaning to it. By emphasizing cer-
tain aspects of an event and embedding their description in headlines, pictures, the
structure of a page, a film or a radio programme, media instruct us both what to
think and how to think about it.11 Such frames act as patterns of interpretation which
affect problem definition, moral evaluation and causal interpretation, and may even
imply particular solutions to the identified problem.
In order to render frames comprehensible to media consumers, an overarching
narrative must exist in which to embed the respective frame; the event to be framed
has to possess certain features that allow journalists to ascribe meaning to it and to
10 The somewhat misleading use of the notion ‘situation’ in the context of the ICC comes from the latter’s
use of the word for countries (‘situation countries’) which are under examination by the ICC prosecutor
in order to find out whether a full-scale investigation (‘investigation countries’) should start, which then
needs to be confirmed by a pretrial chamber.
11 Patrick Roessler, ‘Agenda-Setting, Framing and Priming,’ in The Sage Handbook of Public Opinion
Research, ed. Wolfgang Donsbach and Michael W. Traugott (Los Angeles, CA: Sage, 2008); Robert M.
Entman, ‘Framing: Toward Clarification of a Fractured Paradigm,’ Journal of Communication 43(4)
(1993): 51–58; Erving Goffman, Frame Analysis: An Essay on the Organization of Experience (Lebanon,
NH: Northeastern University Press, 1986).
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interpret it normatively. When events lack these conditions, journalists tend to neg-
lect them.
Three levels of analysis must be distinguished here, all drawn from media content
analysis. In every public sphere a grand narrative channels the flow of scattered and
unrelated information about the past into a comprehensive story, which is shared by
all or most citizens and to which media coverage about current events relates, often
by taking the general knowledge about this story for granted. Thanks to such a grand
narrative, reference in reports and op eds can be limited to a few hints, which are
often incomprehensible to outsiders. The story describing 1994 in Rwanda as a
genocide, during which Hutu killed Tutsi while the international community failed
to intervene, is one such grand narrative, currently shared within Rwanda as well as
by most of the media coverage and popular science accounts outside Rwanda. The
Homeland War in Croatia is another such grand narrative, claiming that in 1995
Croatian forces rightly drove out Serb forces, thus liberating Croatian territory from
aggressors.
Underneath such overarching accounts, which attribute meaning and moral judge-
ment to a whole conflict or an entire historical period, there are ‘media frames’ which
build on these narratives. Frames help journalists and readers to update the grand
narrative and to adapt it to new events and information. Both narratives and frames
contain moral judgements; identify causes and consequences, culprits and victims,
guilt and innocence; and often lead to conclusions about what needs to be done.
However, frames provide interpretation to only a small fragment of the grand narra-
tive – they assess a shorter period of time, often only one incident, such as a battle
within a larger war, a crime committed in the framework of a military campaign or a
political decision within the context of a historical development. For example, jour-
nalists’ assessment of the shelling of the city of Knin in Croatia is such a frame, rest-
ing on readers’ knowledge of the general narrative about the Homeland War, as a
result of which journalists did not need to justify the shelling as the grand narrative
already included the assumption that the war was a ‘just and legitimate’ one. Finally,
there may be cases where a frame is not replaced by another one, but rather changes
with respect to one or several elements, for example, when the legitimacy of a war is
not questioned but the media outlet suddenly starts to mention victims, perpetrators
or features of the fighting which it did not mention before.
Some authors treat frames as independent variables which may lead to specific
consequences (framing effects); others regard frames as dependent variables which
are the outcome of decisions and events beyond the reach of the framing journalist.
In this article, we use frame analysis to determine changes to the dependent variable,
specifically the impact of ICT decisions on grand narratives, media frames and small
changes within media frames.
C A S E S E L E C T I O N C R I T E R I A
In the framework of the case studies, the results of which are presented in this article,
the main criterion for choosing an ICT decision was its salience for the public in the
respective country or entity. In order to be selected, a case had to be sufficiently con-
troversial and the suspect of high enough rank in the hierarchy of the country or
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entity to ensure that it triggered enough media coverage (and therefore frames12)
about the underlying conflict for our analysis (Table 1). We assumed that frame
changes mainly take place after (public) indictments, trial judgments and appeals
judgments and therefore only included cases that would provide us with a maximum
number of such decisions, that is, cases which were already closed by a final ICT ver-
dict. Because our project’s aim was to find out whether ICT decisions can trigger






ICT case from which the decisions
for the impact analyses were
derived
Media used to identify frame shifts or




ICTY Blaskic Slobodna BiH, Hrvatska rijec, Slobodna
Dalmacija, Dnevni list, Dani
ICTY Oric Oslobod-enje, Dnevni avaz, Nezavisne
novine, Dani (weekly)





ICTY Plavsic Nezavisne novine, Glas Srpske (previ-
ously Glas srpski), Euro BlicICTY Lukic and Lukic
(Visegrad)
Kosovo ICTY Haradinaj et al. Koha Ditore, Express, Zeri (weekly)
Serbia International Court of Justice
(ICJ) BiH vs. Serbia




Croatia ICTY Blaskic Vjesnik, Jutarnij list, Vecernji list,
Slobodna DalmacijaGotovina et al.
Sudan UNSC referral to ICC Al Ayam, Khartoum Monitor, The
Citizen, Ray-Al-Shaab, Ajrass-
elhurriya
ICC arrest warrant Al-Bashir
et al.
South Sudan UNSC referral to ICC Khartoum Monitor, The Citizen
ICC arrest warrant Al-Bashir
et al.
Kenya ICC ‘Kenya I’ and ‘Kenya II’ The Standard, The Daily Nation, KTN
TV, The East African
Rwanda ICTR Bagosora et al. The New Times, Imvaho Nshiya
12 For the purposes of this article, media coverage is defined as the content produced by the media, regard-
less of whether or not it contains frames and whether these frames are produced by the respective outlet
or taken over from external sources. (Media often republish content from news agencies and other exter-
nal contributors which contains frames. Sometimes they also publish interviews containing frames. If the
agency material was not redacted or accompanied by the outlet’s own comment, we excluded such con-
tent from our analysis, regarding the frames which it contained as external to the respective outlet.)
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changes in frames and narratives and to identify the circumstances in which such
changes may occur, we concentrated on cases with a high first-sight probability of
such changes. We hypothesized that such changes would be likely when the media
covered cases ending in guilty verdicts against suspects from their ingroup and in
acquittals of suspects from their outgroup. There were a number of exceptions to
this rule. We included the Plavsic case13 (which ended with a plea agreement) be-
cause it was the first case of a high-ranking Bosnian Serb politician admitting guilt at
the ICTY and was therefore likely to trigger guilt externalization and change some of
the preexisting and deeply embedded frames in Bosnian Serb media about the war in
Bosnia. By way of comparison, we also included the Lukic and Lukic case (also called
the ‘Visegrad case’)14 in order to determine whether low-ranking perpetrators trig-
gered similar effects among the same (Bosnian Serb) media as had been the case in
Plavsic. In Kenya, there were no cases concluded which we could analyze. We there-
fore examined the media coverage of the ‘Kenya I’ and ‘Kenya II’ cases,15 both of
which ended without trial judgments.
In countries and entities allowing for media pluralism, we included at least one
outlet from each ideological current (left, right, liberal, close to or critical of the gov-
ernment and the respective ICT). This proved impossible in Rwanda because there
are no media outlets that are critical of the government. It was possible in Sudan,
though our access was often limited by external constraints, for example the unavail-
ability of archives, high access fees or the destruction of media archives during the
conflict.
Initially, we adopted a homogeneous methodological framework for the whole
project, urging all case study researchers to include at least 10 items16 from each
examined medium before and after each respective ICT decision. We hoped thereby
to ensure that changes in media frames were more or less stable and not the result of
one author’s sudden mood change. In the course of the project, it became clear that
such a rigorous framework would be impossible to apply coherently across all cases.
In many cases, the 10 items after an indictment overlapped at least partly with the 10
items preceding a verdict, and sometimes the items containing frames about a first-
instance judgment overlapped with those preceding a second-instance judgment.17
In other cases, the media did not produce enough frame-containing items to reach
the 10-item margin. In almost all countries, TV and radio archives were inaccessible
to our researchers for various reasons: archives were not maintained by some media
in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) and Rwanda, and by any in Sudan and South
Sudan; the archives were technically not searchable (Rwanda); or the archives could
13 ICTY, IT-00-39 and 40/1.
14 ICTY, IT-98-32/1, ‘Visegrad.’
15 ICC-01/09 and ICC-01/09-02/11.
16 We understand an ‘item’ to be a text published in a newspaper or a TV or radio programme containing at
least one frame about the underlying conflict which gave rise to the court case, and in whose framework
an ICT decision was taken.
17 The ICTY, ICTR and ICC conduct their trials on two levels, trial chamber and appeals chamber, but in
some cases (e.g. the ICTY Vukovar trial and the ICTY Haradinaj trials) the appeals chamber orders a trial
whose verdict can then be challenged on appeal, ultimately leading to three verdicts.
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only be accessed after paying outrageously high fees, for which we had no financial
cover in the project budget (Croatia and BiH).
D E F I N I N G A N D M E A S U R I N G I M P A C T
For this study, we assumed the influence of ICT decisions on media frames when
such frames (or elements thereof) changed after an ICT decision had been issued
and the change was stable over time, that is, it occurred consistently in several or all
of the 10 items examined. At the same time, the new media frames detected after an
ICT decision had to overlap content-wise with frame elements invoked in the ICT
decision. For example, the interpretation of the conflict and the change in media
frame in Sudan, from one describing the Darfur conflict as tribal to one based on
underdevelopment, can only be considered a result of an ICC decision if the latter
also contained this ‘underdevelopment frame’ or at least elements thereof.18
Additionally, in every case study we required our field researchers to check for other
factors which could have triggered the frame change, such as a change of ownership
of the respective media outlet, a change of government censorship policy or a deci-
sion of another national or international body.19 Only when a frame shift was closer
in time to the ICT decision than to a third factor, and when the new frame’s content
overlapped at least partly with the content of the ICT decision, did we assume the
shift to be triggered by the ICT decision.
I M P A C T O F I C T D E C I S I O N S O N G R A N D N A R R A T I V E S
ICTY decisions and judgments did not change the Croatian narrative about the
Homeland War as a just and legal endeavour to liberate the country from Serb ag-
gression, nor did it incline Serbs to regard the wars in Bosnia or Kosovo as a justified
liberation campaign against Serb oppression. ICT decisions did not shatter the grand
narrative about the 1994 genocide in Rwanda, and they did not change what Kenyan
journalists wrote about the postelection violence in 2008. In Sudan, censorship lim-
ited Arab-language newspapers’ possibilities to cover and interpret the Darfur con-
flict to such an extent that no grand narrative even came into being. Unlike other
countries and entities, where governments promoted their own narrative about a
past conflict (e.g. in Kosovo, Croatia and Rwanda), the Sudanese government was
18 Sudanese media tended to present the conflict in Darfur as being a result of a policy of keeping Darfur
underdeveloped. This policy, in their opinion, had been conducted from colonial times and was being
continued by the Omar al-Bashir government. According to this frame, rebels in Darfur had risen in order
to protest against this policy and achieve improvements in infrastructure and service delivery, which, if
undertaken, would end the conflict. A competing frame claimed the conflict in Darfur to be caused by tri-
bal animosities, in which the central government had no important role other than being a potential
mediator.
19 This is why the ICJ appears in our research. Initially, it was not part of the research design as it is not an
ICT, but its ruling in Bosnia vs. Serbia appeared as the main factor (see Table 1) explaining why changes
in Serb media frames, which appeared after the Scorpions video about Serbia’s alleged guilt for the
Srebrenica genocide, were later partly reversed by some of these media. For the ICJ ruling, see, ‘Case
Concerning Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide
(Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro) Judgment of 26 February 2007,’ https://www.icj-
cij.org/files/case-related/91/091-20070226-JUD-01-00-EN.pdf (accessed 25 January 2019). During the
time of the proceedings, Serbia was first part of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and then of the State
Union of Serbia and Montenegro, becoming independent in 2006 (after Montenegro’s secession).
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not interested in imposing its own interpretation of the Darfur conflict on the
Sudanese media and instead did its utmost to silence any information about the
events in Darfur. Media coverage was scarce, fragmentary and lacked clear patterns
of interpretation. Even after the constitutional reform in 2005, only a few media
frames about Darfur could be detected.
In some cases, we identified changes in the grand narrative invoked by a media
outlet, but they were all attributed to third factors. After the 2000 trial judgment in
the Blaskic case at the ICTY,20 which outlined the crimes committed and sentenced
the accused to 45 years of imprisonment, some Croatian and Bosnian Croat newspa-
pers started to blame the former Croatian leadership under Franjo Tud-man for its
interference in BiH and the crimes committed by Croatian units there.21 The news-
papers had not done so before, instead presenting the fights of Croatian units in
Bosnia as a kind of self-defence against an attack by Bosniak troops. Hrvatska rijec, a
paper very close to the Bosnian Croat leadership, even argued that the Bosniak
crimes were worse than those committed by Croats.22 The blaming of Tud-man is a
clear example of the externalization of guilt.23 However, despite the impression cre-
ated, it was not triggered by the ICTY’s Blaskic judgment, but by government change
in Croatia. Tud-man died in 1999, and in 2000 Stjepan Mesic, a dissident from
Tud-man’s party, was elected president. The new government, led by Ivica Racan,
which emerged from the parliamentary elections, started to cooperate with the ICTY
and delivered files from the state archives. They helped to exonerate Tihomir Blaskic
from some of the crimes for which he had been sentenced, thus shifting the blame to
members of the previous government. This helped Mesic to discredit Tud-man’s
party, led to a more lenient appeals judgment for Blaskic and put a new narrative in
place, which admitted Croatia’s intervention in the war in Bosnia and the commis-
sion of crimes, but blamed the former government, not Croatia or the Croatian na-
tion. This new narrative led to frame changes in some Bosnian Croat media but they
cannot be attributed to the ICTY, whose trial judgment was issued a month after
20 ICTY, IT-95-14, ‘Lasva Valley.’
21 Bisera Lusic, ‘Vjerujem u blazu presudu,’ Slobodna Dalmacija, 4 March 2000.
22 Marko Herceg, ‘Ispunjena zadaca u obrani hrvatskih prostora i Hrvata,’ Hrvatska rijec, 2 September 1995.
See also, Srecko Paponja, ‘Vrijeme ce pokazati istinu,’ Hrvatska rijec, 10 September 1995; Karlo Papic,
‘Herceg-Bosna, istocni grijeh hrvatske politike,’ Hrvatska rijec, 27 August 1996; Branka Janko, ‘Dan
“Brigade nepobjedivih”!’ Hrvatska rijec, 4 November 1995. Before 2000, the newspaper Feral Tribune had
already presented the Croatian interference in BiH as an aggression. Zaneta Mrkonjic, ‘Suditi svim zlo-
inima!’ Hrvatska rijec, 13 May 1995; Zlatko Tulic, ‘Stradanja Hrvata u BiH minimizirana,’ Hrvatska rijec, 9
September 1995.
23 For the purposes of this article, externalization of guilt means the collective attempt to put the blame for
past wrongdoings on outsiders and the refusal to search for guilt within one’s own community or society
(ingroup). The concept is quite popular in psychology, where it is mostly used to describe an individual
way of coping with shame. From a normative point of view, externalization of guilt is ambiguous, because
it hinders collective self-criticism and prevents ingroup members from learning from past errors. At the
same time, however, it helps the ingroup to keep a positive collective self-image by putting the blame for
the past on a few leaders (who are then ousted, punished, banned, etc.), thus preventing the group mem-
bers from siding with these leaders. June Price Tangney and Ronda L. Dearing, Shame and Guilt (New
York: Guilford Press, 2002); Ronald C. Johnson, George P. Danko, Yau-Huang Huang, Jong Young Park,
Steven B. Johnson and Craig T. Nagoshi, ‘Guilt, Shame, and Adjustment in Three Cultures,’ Personality
and Individual Differences 8(3) (1987): 357–364.
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Mesic had taken office, by which time the frames about the Croatian intervention in
Bosnia had already changed.
A similar change of frame elements took place after the appeals judgment in the
Naser Oric case at the ICTY,24 when the Bosnian newspaper Nezavisne novine started
to dedicate more space to Bosnian Serb victims’ commemorations and printed state-
ments of Serb victims of atrocities committed by Bosniak fighters. However, a closer
look at the situation of the newspaper revealed that this change was triggered by a
shift in the editor’s policy. In 2007 the owner of the newspaper came under the influ-
ence of the government of Republika Srpska and started to push his paper in a pro-
Serb direction, also giving more space for denial of the genocide committed in
Srebrenica.
In parts of the Sudanese Arab-language media (Al Ayam, Ray Al-Shaab and Ajrass-
elhurriya), entire frames about the Darfur conflict were changed. These could not,
however, be the result of an ICC decision because the respective ICC arrest warrants
did not contain any elements of the new frames. The frame changes happened long
after the warrants had been issued. In 2005, the UNSC referred the situation in
Darfur to the ICC, allowing the ICC prosecutor to investigate the crimes committed
there.25 Two years later, the ICC issued the first Sudan-related arrest warrant, after
which the first frame blaming the government for the conflict in Darfur started to ap-
pear in the daily Al Ayam, which so far had only superficially and in a very limited
way dealt with the conflict, claiming that the government in Khartoum had lost con-
trol over Darfur because of a lack of appropriate information. Al Ayam’s new ap-
proach was due to the enactment of a new constitution in 2005 as a result of the
peace negotiations between the government in Khartoum and the leaders of the
South Sudan opposition. The result provided for the inclusion of South Sudanese
politicians in the national government. These changes increased media pluralism and
allowed Arab-language media to comment on Darfur relatively freely. But these new
frames produced by the media did not overlap with the way the UNSC referral and
the first ICC arrest warrant had described the conflict.
In some countries, neither changes of narratives nor frame changes took place. In
Kosovo, Montenegro and the Serb part of Bosnia, the Republika Srpska, ICTY deci-
sions reinforced existing frames which saw the ICTY trials in a context of nation
building. Convictions of accused war heroes were interpreted as an attack on the en-
tire nation and convictions of outgroup members were seen as a confirmation of the
outgroup’s moral inferiority. Something similar happened in English-language media
in Sudan (The Khartoum Monitor and The Citizen) and, after the independence of
South Sudan in 2011, in South Sudanese English-language media.26 Whatever
24 ICTY, IT-03-68.
25 Sudan was not and is still not a signatory to the Rome Statute. Investigations were therefore only possible
if the government had lodged a self-referral and acceptance of ICC jurisdiction under art. 12 of the Rome
Statute (which it had no reason to do) or through a referral by the UNSC.
26 After South Sudan’s independence, The Khartoum Monitor and The Citizen moved their headquarters to
Juba. See, ‘The Sudanese Press after Separation – Contested Identities of Journalism,’ https://www.sudan
tribune.com/IMG/pdf/sudanstudie2012.pdf (accessed 25 January 2019); Obaj Shago, ‘Why Nhial Bol
Quit Politics,’ Eye Radio, 21 September 2016, http://www.eyeradio.org/nhial-bol-quit-politics/ (accessed
25 January 2019).
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decision the ICC issued, it was interpreted as proof of the veracity of the frames
which these media had created before and which were usually hostile to the govern-
ment of Omar al-Bashir. The conflict in Darfur was denounced as a genocide com-
mitted by the Al-Bashir regime against either ‘Darfurians,’ ‘ethnic African tribes’ or
‘unarmed civilians.’27
In Kosovo, Kenya and Rwanda, there was yet another reason why frames did not
change. Social control proved stronger and more successful in preventing changes of
frames than even censorship did. The ICTR did not cause any changes in the geno-
cide frames of the Rwandan media because the Rwandan government tended to im-
pose its own compulsory frames on the media and to monitor whether they actually
used them.28 In Kosovo and Kenya, the governments do not have any direct grip on
media coverage and media tend to be pluralistic with regard to many issues. But in
Kosovo they were homogeneous in their approach to the war with Serbia at the end
of the 1990s. No ICTY decision changed any of the media frames, which presented
the Kosovo Liberation Army’s struggle as a righteous liberation fight against Serb
oppressors. In Kenya, social control went in the opposite direction, resulting in any
reference to ethnicity vanishing from media coverage about the 2008 postelection
violence in the country which the ICC investigated. Anxious not to stir up ethnic
hatred, journalists avoided ethnic labels in their reports and refused to identify specif-
ic political actors with ethnic groups, regardless of whether they appeared as victims
or perpetrators in the text.29 This tendency was strong enough to make some reports
incomprehensible to outsiders and to readers who were not familiar with the ethnic
fabric of the situation portrayed by the outlet.30 Until 2014, Kenyan media with a
predominant audience in Kenya not only avoided any ethnic labelling of the post-
election violence in 2008, but also described the events as a kind of natural disaster
27 In these reports and comments, the ethnic landscape of Darfur was never described. The Citizen and The
Khartoum Monitor avoided mentioning ethnic labels and presented the conflict in Darfur as one between
the central government and the Janjaweed militias (as the government’s executioners) on the one hand
and all Darfurians on the other. See, The Khartoum Monitor, 20 November 2006, 27 November 2006, 29
August 2007, 11 December 2006, 16 December 2006, 17 December 2006, 5 August 2007, 20 August
2007, 21 August 2007 (the issue was dated incorrectly as 201 August), 1 November 2007, 4 November
2007, 7 November 2007, 9 November 2007, 15 November 2007; as well as The Citizen, 23 July 2007, 2
August 2007, 6 August 2007, 16 August 2007, 20 August 2007, 23 August 2007 and 1 September 2007.
28 The result is that the content of reports about genocide commemorations is usually exactly the same in
all observed media. Reports containing frames about the genocide mostly appear in Rwandan media in
connection with extradition cases of suspects from abroad to Rwanda or in the context of ICTR decisions.
They usually reflect the overwhelming consensus of the government and victims’ organizations, according
to which perpetrators deserve the harshest possible punishment, but they hardly ever contain interpreta-
tions (or even descriptions) of the genocide itself. Frames about the genocide changed slightly in Rwanda
and the ‘Rwandan genocide’ became the ‘genocide of the Tutsi.’ This was not a result of ICTR decisions,
however, but rather of the constitutional reform in Rwanda and a change in censorship policy.
29 Jessica Gustafsson, ‘Media and the 2013 Kenyan Election: From Hate Speech to Peace Preaching,’
Conflict and Communication 15(1) (2016): 1–13. It would be easy to explain the absence of ethnic frames
in the coverage of the genocide commemorations in Rwanda by pointing to censorship, but at least a part
of this reluctance seemed to be due to a similar anxiety as in Kenya about stirring up ethnic hatred by
using ethnic labels in media coverage. This explains the paradox that Rwanda has a strongly regulated
media environment whereas Kenya does not, but in both countries media do their utmost to avoid ethnic
labels in their reporting.
30 One exception to this rule was The East African, which has many readers outside Kenya (in Tanzania,
Rwanda and Uganda). Its reporters often referred to ethnic labels.
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which had befallen Kenya, without mentioning who had been perpetrator and who
had been victim.31 This changed with the ICC trial hearings in 2014, at least with re-
gard to the most popular media: The Standard, The Daily Nation and KTN TV. The
East African, which has a considerable audience in neighbouring countries, frequently
used ethnic labels in its coverage of the postelection violence, as well as throughout
and after the ICC hearings. With the start of these hearings, the Kenyan media could
no longer refrain from associating accused and witnesses with ethnic groups – not
doing so would have rendered their trial coverage totally incomprehensible. The
ICC trial hearings, broadcast to Kenya online and in TV coverage, thus triggered
quite considerable frame changes, turning the 2008 postelection violence from a pol-
itical conflict into an ethnic one. This change cannot, however, be attributed to an in-
dictment or verdict, but only to the beginning of the trial hearings. Nevertheless, if
one regards the start of the hearings as an ICC decision, then there was a clear ICC
influence on media coverage in Kenya.32
In the cases of some Croat and Serb media, elements of existing and well-
established frames changed slightly. In these cases, the media did not question the
general interpretation of collective responsibility – who was considered collective vic-
tims or collective perpetrators during the conflict. However, the trial judgments in
Gotovina et al. and in Mrksic et al. (the so called ‘Vukovar hospital trial’), the guilty
plea by Biljana Plavsic (together with the subsequent judgment) as well as the trial
judgment in Lukic and Lukic increased media awareness with regard to victims.
While stories about outgroup victims had been neglected and silenced before the re-
spective ICT decisions, victims were mentioned (sometimes even with empathy) in
media reports after these ICTY decisions.
In some cases, small changes in frame elements could be detected. For example,
as a result of the trial judgment in the Vukovar case, prisoners who had been killed
by militia members no longer appeared as ‘soldiers’ but as ‘wounded civilians’ in the
Serbian newspaper Vreme. Remarkably, one of these ‘civilians’ was described as ‘a
pregnant woman.’33 After the trial judgment in Gotovina et al., a discussion started in
the Croatian newspaper Jutarnji list about whether and how to hold low-ranking per-
petrators accountable for atrocities committed against Serb civilians.34 Before the
trial, the very existence of such victims was denied and the entire military campaign
presented as a victorious liberation struggle against Serb aggression – with no out-
group victims at all.
31 A similar approach to the 1994 genocide in Rwanda can be found in the Rwandan media’s coverage of
the annual genocide commemorations.
32 From a normative point of view, such an ethnification of media coverage can hardly be seen as consistent
with the ICC’s mission, because it tends to deepen ethnic cleavages. On the other hand, ICT indictments
and judgments (including the ICC’s) often tend to (over)emphasize ethnicity. The ICTR did so by trying
to explain the genocidal violence through a ‘Hutu killed Tutsi’ lens (neglecting the impact of private and
political rather than ethnic violence); the ICTY did so by claiming that mass violence only took place as a
result of one ingroup (e.g. ‘the Serbs’) targeting one or several outgroups (‘non-Serbs’) and omitting to
mention intragroup violence. See, Bachmann and Fatic, supra n 4.
33 Tatjana Tagirov, ‘Antihrvatska presuda antisrpskog suda,’ Vreme, 4 October 2010.
34 Kresimir Zabec, ‘Nema mira za 4 ratna druga,’ Jutarnji list, 8 April 2000; Davor Ivankovic, ‘General
Gotovina: Politicari se igraju sa mnom,’ Jutarnji list, 20 June 2001.
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A similar but much more significant development took place after the release of
the so-called Scorpions video, a prosecution piece of evidence used in Milosevic35
showing the execution of surrendered Bosniak men by Serb paramilitaries. The video
was released to the media by an influential Serbian human rights NGO, the
Humanitarian Law Center from Belgrade. The video managed to shift frames even in
media which so far had rejected any responsibility on the part of their country for
war crimes and which had kept a fierce anti-ICTY attitude in their reporting. This
frame change, however, was not due to a formal ICTY decision but to the action of
the Humanitarian Law Center, which decided the timing and context (the Milosevic
trial) of the video’s release.36 Its impact was later moderated by the International
Court of Justice’s (ICJ) ruling in the Bosnia vs. Serbia case,37 when the ICJ found
Serbia not guilty of genocide in Bosnia but instead guilty of not preventing it and of
having failed to surrender Ratko Mladic to the ICTY. Two newspapers in Serbia
(Vreme and Danas) had used frames blaming their state for genocide in Bosnia but
backtracked from them after the ICJ ruling.
Total replacement of one frame by a different one was hardly ever observed. But
after some ICTY decisions, new elements appeared in preexisting frames, for in-
stance, information about outgroup victims and about atrocities committed by the
forces which the respective media supported. The most explicit frame change was
found in the Croatian daily Jutarnji list’s coverage of the Gotovina trial. Ante
Gotovina and two other high-ranking military officers of wartime Croatia had been
indicted for war crimes and crimes against humanity, committed during and after the
Croatian army’s campaign to regain control over the Croatian–Bosnian borderland
and Eastern Slavonia in 1995. Operation Flash and Operation Storm, during which
Croatia regained control of the borderland, were regarded as part of a morally justi-
fied liberation struggle against foreign aggressors who had occupied the region after
1991. If Croatian media conceded there had also been victims on the Serb side dur-
ing the fights, they were regarded as the exception to the rule, according to which
the main war victims were those Croatian soldiers who had been killed in action.
Even before the indictment was published, Jutarnji list admitted the existence of indi-
vidual Serb victims. Like other Croatian newspapers, the outlet had declared the
Homeland War a shining victory, untainted by any crimes against the enemy. The
latter part of the frame did not change after the trial judgment, which found all three
accused guilty of war crimes and crimes against humanity and emphasized the civil-
ian victims who had been killed after the military operations. But by then Jutarnji
list’s coverage no longer omitted civilian Serb victims: ‘during and after the operation
“Storm” hundreds of Serbian civilians were killed. . .many houses were burned
and. . .many properties were plundered.’38 Zoran Pusic from the Civic Committee
35 ICTY, IT-02-54.
36 Vladimir Petrovic, ‘A Crack in the Wall of Denial: The Scorpions Video in and out of the Courtroom,’ in
Narratives of Justice in and out of the Courtroom: Former Yugoslavia and Beyond, ed. D. Zarkov and M.
Glasius (Cham: Springer, 2014). The newspaper which changed its frames so dramatically was the daily
Politika.
37 International Court of Justice, Bosnia and Herzegovina vs. Serbia and Montenegro, Application of the
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide.
38 Davor Butkovic, ‘Nije rijec o presudi Hrvatskoj, nego o presudi Tud-manu,’ Jutarnji list, 16 April 2011.
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for Human Rights estimated the number of victims murdered after Operation Storm
at around 600 and claimed that almost nobody had been tried for those crimes.39
Before the trial judgment, Jutarnji list had regarded Serb victims as individual, iso-
lated incidents, a kind of inevitable collateral damage of the fighting. After the trial
judgment, the newspaper transformed them from accidental victims into targets of a
discriminatory policy carried out by the former leadership of Croatia. The paper did
not point fingers at the three generals as the perpetrators of those crimes, instead
calling for the ‘real’ criminals to be caught and brought to trial in a court. The news-
paper did not entirely endorse the frames from the ICTY indictment and the trial
judgment, according to which the main aim of Operation Storm had been the cre-
ation of an ethnically homogeneous independent Croatia. But the journalists
included those frame elements which regarded the repressions against the Serb
population as systematic and politically desired in order to drive all Serbs out of
these parts of Croatia.
These changes even survived the appeals judgment, which reversed the trial judg-
ment and exonerated all three accused. The day after Gotovina and Mladen Markac
were acquitted of all charges, Jutarnji list opened with the headline ‘The Day When a
New, Happy Country Was Created’ and quoted Gotovina’s statement that ‘we won
the first, and now the second Storm.’40 After the controversial judgment, which came
as a complete surprise to most observers, Jutarnji list still stuck to its frame about
Serb victims targeted by state persecution and demanded that those responsible for
crimes committed after Operation Storm be brought to justice because, ‘without the
fulfilment of justice for all victims of crimes, independently from the fact of who they
were, the war in Croatia cannot be considered to be completely over.’41 Neither the
trial judgment nor the appeals judgment shattered the Croatian grand narrative
about the Homeland War as a victorious liberation struggle against Serb forces, but
the trial judgment prompted Jutarnji list to include at least some information about
systemic crimes, Serb victims of state persecution and Croatian (direct) perpetrators
who had gone unpunished.
Before the Gotovina et al. trial judgment, the Homeland War had been a just war
in which the Croatian side had fought back against Serb aggression, without deliber-
ately causing any civilian victims and without committing any atrocities. After the
trial judgment, the Homeland War still appeared as a just and victorious war in the
Croatian media, but now journalists tried to explain away victims and atrocities, or
openly called for the prosecution of Croatian perpetrators. Some commentators rela-
tivized the crimes mentioned in the judgment, whose existence they had denied be-
fore and during the trial.
W H E N D O I C T D E C I S I O N S M A T T E R I N T H E M E D I A ?
The limited number of cases examined (partly a result of the limited number of
countries affected by ICT jurisdiction) does not allow for too much generalization,
but some conclusions can be drawn from the evidence.
39 Zoran Pusic, ‘Haag nije osudio akciju Oluja, nego njezinu zloupotrebu,’ Jutarnji list, 20 April 2011.
40 ‘Gotovina: Dobili smo prvu i sad drugu Oluju,’ Jutarnji list, 17 November 2012.
41 Jelena Lovric, ‘Generalov zadatak u miru,’ Jutarnji list, 19 November 2012.
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Being a democratic, pluralistic and multiparty country increases the probability of
ICT decisions triggering changes in media interpretations of a troubled past, whether
this concerns grand narratives, alters media frames or only affects elements of preex-
isting and deeply embedded frames. The strongest influence with regard to the
media was observed in Serbia, Croatia, Bosnia and, to a lesser extent, Kenya, all of
which are pluralist democracies. This hardly comes as a surprise. Nevertheless, media
in countries under authoritarian rule (Sudan, Rwanda) were not immune to changes
in frames, which were sometimes the result of grassroots pressure rather than
changes in top-down censorship and media policies. The latter was observed in
Arab-language media after 2005, when several different frames about Darfur
emerged, some of which were critical of or even hostile to the government in
Khartoum. However, none of these changes could be attributed to previous ICC
decisions. Instead, they took place as a result of political liberalization and, in
Rwanda, emerged after constitutional change and a new top-down policy renaming
the ‘Rwandan genocide’ the ‘genocide against the Tutsi’ in the aftermath of the con-
stitutional revision of 2008.42
Furthermore, the media content analysis of democratic, pluralist countries with
multiparty competition revealed quite a lot of frame shifts (and changes in frame ele-
ments) triggered by ICT decisions in some countries and entities, but none in
others. This variation can best be explained by distinguishing between those coun-
tries and entities which were engaged in nation building during the timeframe of our
analysis and those which were not. There were frame changes and frame element
changes in Republika Srpska after the Lukic and Lukic trial judgment and in Croatian
and Bosnian Croat media after the Blaskic trial judgment. But they were all due to
factors other than the ICTY. In Kosovo, where nation building was under way, the
controversial and strongly mediatized Haradinaj et al. trial did not lead to any frame
changes.43 None of these countries and entities had yet completed their nation-
building process and their publics tended to discard ICT judgments against members
of their ingroup as attacks on that process (and to endorse decisions against out-
group members as support for nation building). The effects of guilt externalization,
which ICTs can trigger, were therefore unlikely to occur because the public tended
to side with accused persons, especially if they are or were military or political lead-
ers. The situation was different in states which are fully recognized as sovereign
countries and that wield complete control over their territory and their populace,
like Serbia and Croatia. There, ICT decisions against prominent politicians and mili-
tary leaders sometimes triggered frame changes, which, in the case of Croatia,
remained stable even after an ICT decision was reversed (Table 2).
It was not the core objective of our research to find out which factors other than
ICT decisions could cause frame changes in the media. We addressed this only in
order to exclude ICT influence as a factor in frame changes. Some of these third fac-
tors which can trigger changes in media coverage are consistent with conventional
wisdom, like changes in government (Croatia), in government policies concerning
42 Hélène Dumas and Rémi Korman, ‘Espaces de la mémoire du génocide des Tutsis au Rwanda.
Mémoriaux et lieux de mémoire,’ Afrique Contemporaine 2(238) (2011): 11–27.
43 ICTY, IT-04-84.
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Table 2. Cases in which frame changes were identified
Country or entity where
frame changes were
detected after an ICT
decision
Kind of frame change or change of
frame element which took place
Can the change be attrib-
uted to the respective ICT
decision?
Federation of BiH
ICTY Blaskic Externalization of guilt No (regime change in
Croatia)
ICTY Oric More awareness of outgroup
victims







ICTY Lukic and Lukic More awareness of outgroup
victims
No (change was due to
NGO activities)
Kosovo
Serbia ICJ BiH vs. Serbia Embedded ‘genocide label’ in
media coverage
Yes
ICTY Krstic Embedded ‘genocide label’ in
media coverage
Yes
ICTY ‘Vukovar hospital’ More awareness of outgroup
victims
Yes
Croatia ICTY Blaskic More awareness of outgroup
victims
No (change was due to
government change in
Croatia)Externalization of guilt




More awareness of direct
ingroup perpetrators












Kenya ICC ‘Kenya I’ and
‘Kenya II’
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collective memory (Rwanda) and in the overall political environment (Sudan).
However, we also identified some unexpected frame changers when trying to estab-
lish whether a change in media coverage could be attributed to anything other than
the ICT decision under scrutiny. These included civil society actors like human
rights NGOs and advocacy groups, for example the Humanitarian Law Center in
Belgrade, which revealed the Scorpions video. In the Visegrad case, the daily Nezavisne
novine started to cover the commemorations organized by (mostly Bosniak) victims’
NGOs like Zena-zrtva rata (Woman-victim of the war) and Visegrad 92, which
brought an emphasis on crimes and crime victims into the outlet’s coverage. This
could not have been a result of an ICT decision, since the first indictment was issued
in 2000 and the Lukic brothers were only arrested and tried after 2008. The com-
memorations launched by the Bosniak NGOs, however, coincided with the change
in Nezavisne novine’s frame elements. A similar pattern of NGO-induced changes in
media frames was observed when the international ‘Save Darfur’ campaign was
launched against the Sudanese government. It included frames which were then
taken over by the Sudanese English-language newspapers, long before the ICC con-
firmed the genocide charges in its second arrest warrant against members of the
Sudanese leadership.
Ultimately, ICTs have difficulties in causing changes in media frames and can
hope to do so only in pluralist, democratic countries with a competitive media envir-
onment – this is the rule, but there are exceptions. ICTs sometimes managed to
embed certain interpretations of past events in media coverage when they promoted
a simple and judgmental label carrying heavy moral censure. The ICTY did so when
it condemned the atrocities after the fall of Srebrenica in its rule 61 hearings.44 It
also did so in the Krstic trial and appeals judgments,45 when it found the massacres
after the fall of Srebrenica genocidal, thus attaching the genocide label to Srebrenica
for good. At the beginning of its activities in Rwanda, the ICTR refrained from
imposing a genocide label. In Karemera, the ICTR finally declared the genocide in
Rwanda a ‘commonly known fact,’ thus relieving the prosecution of the burden of
proving that genocide had happened, but that took place 10 years after the ICTR
had been established.46 In the meantime, many other actors, including the UNSC,
had thrown the genocide label into the public realm. It became the predominant pat-
tern of describing the massacres of 1994, but not because of the ICTR.
Finally, it should also be acknowledged that even in cases where an ICT managed
to trigger a change in frames or frame elements about the underlying conflict, this
change was not always in line with the respective ICT’s mission. There is a fair
amount of controversy in the literature about what such a mission could or should
44 Hearings according to rule 61 of the ICTY’s rules of procedure and evidence can be regarded as a kind of
public confirmation of charges, which, in the case of Radovan Karadzic and Ratko Mladic, took place in
the absence of both accused. The ICTY held them (despite criticism from inside and outside the ICTY)
in an attempt to preempt an amnesty for both suspects during the Dayton negotiations. See, Bachmann
et al., supra n 1.
45 ICTY, IT-98-33, ‘Srebrenica – Drina Corps.’
46 Prosecutor v. Karemera et al., Case No. ICTR-98-44AR73(C), ‘Decision on Prosecution Motion for
Judicial Notice’ (9 November 2005); Richard Ashby Wilson, Writing History in International Criminal
Trials (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010).
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entail. Some authors opt to restrict ICTs’ missions to the narrow task of doing justice
and judging perpetrators, whereas others see the tasks of ICTs as including the pro-
motion of a culture of human rights and political accountability.47 Irrespective of
which position is taken, it cannot be regarded as consistent with the mission of any
ICT if its decision is followed by media frames which morally exonerate a suspect
who was convicted by the ICT, call for solidarity with him or declare him a hero.
However, this happened in several cases. When Plavsic surrendered to the ICTY and
pled guilty, admitting to crimes against humanity, she did not become a repentant
criminal in the Serb Bosnian media, but a hero who had sacrificed herself for her na-
tion. The same happened after the first-instance trial against Gotovina in the cover-
age of Slobodna Dalmacija, where he was depicted as ‘a martyr for his nation’ after
being sentenced for war crimes and crimes against humanity.48 One newspaper
claimed him ‘crucified instead of Tud-man.’49 One may doubt, too, whether the ethni-
fication of the postelection violence in Kenya after the start of the ICC trial hearings
was in line with the ICC’s mission, which aims at individualizing guilt rather than
promoting ethnic cleavages and collective stigmatization. In sum, an ICT decision
can trigger changes in and of media frames, but only in democratic countries with
party competition and media pluralism, and which do not embark on nation build-
ing. However, these frame changes do not always take place in a way which would
please judges or prosecutors.
47 Bachmann et al., supra n 1; Orentlicher, supra n 2; Jelena Subotic, Hijacked Justice: Dealing with the Past
in the Balkans (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2009).
48 Jovana Mihajlovic Trbovc, ‘Homecomings from “The Hague”: Media Coverage of ICTY Defendants after
Trial and Punishment,’ International Criminal Justice Review 28(4) (2018): 406–422; Barbora Hola and
Olivera Simic, ‘ICTY Celebrities: War Criminals Coming Home,’ International Criminal Justice Review
28(4) (2018): 285–290.
49 Danko Plevnik and Umjesto Tud-mana, ‘razapet je Gotovina,’ Slobodna Dalmacija, 16 April 2011; Sasa
Jadrijevic Tomas, ‘Gotovina se oprostio od Cermaka, sudac Orie pobjegao od novinara,’ Slobodna
Dalmacija, 16 April 2011.
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